It is a sad yet understandable truth that most people switch off when they hear the word ‘Iraq’. As I research this article, I read that a lorry has been driven into the heart of the old Sadriya market of central Baghdad. It was carrying an entire ton of explosives, extraordinary even by Baghdad standards. The explosion ripped through the crowded marketplace, shattering stalls and leaving a huge crater which was the grave for one hundred and thirty people. It injured a further three hundred. Despite the fact that this death toll was more than double that of the July 7th London bombings (which killed fifty-two), it is highly unlikely that you will recall the incident. On the day it occurred your eyes, like mine, may have flittered over the headline, blank and unsurprised, but that would be it.

That very same day, gunmen opened fire on a police checkpoint killing six and injuring a further six. In Kirkuk, seven car bombs ripped through the centre of the city, killing five and injuring forty. The latter two events would not have even made the news if it had not been for the Sadriya market bombing – journalists like to provide a little context. The chances of one percent of the British or US population recalling these incidents are extremely slim. This is not because we don’t care. It is just that so unexceptional are these killings in the plethora of sectarian violence that is modern Iraq, so regular are the reports of massacres, kidnappings and atrocities, that such events have become background noise. Much like Vietnam, it has become the grim shadow that hangs over the country which everyone would like to forget.

However, this does not mean Iraq is forgotten, nor of course that it should be. Individual incidents may blur but the knowledge of the overall quagmire of death and destruction does not. Politicians in America and the UK who instigated or supported the war are paying a bitter price. George Bush faces approval rates as low as 28% – comparable in recent history only to Nixon just before his resignation over Watergate. The President has paid the price with the loss of both the House and the Senate. Tony Blair’s legacy is unlikely to ever recover from the stain of Iraq – whether Gordon Brown’s will at the next election remains to be seen. That Labour is already consistently lagging behind the Tories in the polls is an indication.

But for all the political ramifications, the question of what on earth to do in Iraq still echoes through the corridors of Congress and Parliament with no genuinely acceptable answer. There is a good reason for this: there is not one. This is why we find it painful to pay attention to the day to day events in Iraq. Whether to go to war or not raised passions – both sides of the argument were offering positives: liberation of Iraq and removal of its WMDS on the one hand and not going to war on the other. In finding a way out of the Iraq crisis there is no right side to choose. We are faced instead with the choice between the bad and the ugly.

Neither the phased withdrawal of troops desired by many of the Democrats, nor the 20,000 troop increase advocated by Bush and the Pentagon is an easy solution. It is foolishness to suggest anything to the contrary. Each is an extraordinary gamble. Both options could easily and bloodily fail. The only difference is that withdrawal by the coalition no longer gambles US and British lives, just Iraqi ones.

Various other ‘radical’ solutions besides withdrawal and escalation have been proposed by more peripheral commentators. However these are, sadly, primarily based in fantasy. The most commonly proposed is to divide Iraq into three sections: the Kurdish north, Shia south and Sunni centre. However, this is ludicrous on the most rudimentary levels as Iraq is not divided on neat ethnic lines. Much of it is a mix of Sunni and Shia. Any move towards an independent Kurdish state would also invite fierce opposition from Turkey. Short of ethnically cleansing swathes of Iraq it is impossible.

An approach more based in reality, proposed by the Iraq Study Group in America, is to engage Syria and Iran diplomatically and thus attempt to stem the flow of terrorists, weapons and support for sectarian groups. However, tensions between America and Iran over nuclear proliferation make such an action extremely unlikely. And even without the nuclear dynamic, the diplomatic relations between America, Syria and Iran are just not strong enough to make any real, noticeable difference.

Thus there is only one real question, should we withdraw troops or increase their numbers? Given the lack of any easy solution, it is a difficult dilemma. Maybe we are seeing the beginnings of an answer with the troop withdrawals recently announced by Blair. However, whilst it may reflect that the political wind is starting to blow towards exit we cannot read too much into an announcement that a mere 1,500 troops are being removed. It is an irrelevance compared to America’s current 130,000 and a potential 20,000 more on the way.

Proponents of an increase in troops believe that new tactics and a “surge” of extra soldiers will finally secure the country. However, one must look at this rationally. There will be no surge in troop numbers – they will come slowly and predictably.. It will represent little more than a 15 percent increase – less than that if more UK forces pull out. I have made the direness of the situation abundantly clear, so will a 15 percent increase really make that much difference? Of course not.
This is made very evident by the new offensive of General Petraneus, an “expert in counterinsurgency”, who has just become the new head of US troops in Iraq. Last week he began a massive operation to “retake Baghdad”. The operation is still in its initial stages of ‘clear’ and ‘hold’ and thus the troop concentration is massive– unsustainable and deliberately short term. Yet on the first Sunday several huge car bombs killed 60. On Monday three suicide bombers killed many more. If attacks of this intensity are still occurring when such a huge portion of troops are deployed, the question begs of how on earth the coalition is ever going to reach the third stage of ‘retainment’ across Baghdad, let alone the whole of Iraq, however many troops are committed. Increasing troops by fifteen percent is as futile an act as trying to take down a Humvee with a pebble.
Supporters of troop increases cite the supposed alternative: civil war and a vacuum of power. However, one is very entitled to yell back in the face of this argument that such an event will not begin when troops leave Iraq–it began when they first set foot in Iraq nearly 4 years ago. It is a fair point. So far the occupation has cost between 55,000 and 655,000 lives, sectarian violence represents the vast majority of this. The former figure is from Iraq Body Count, a campaign group and the latter the findings of a group of US scientists recently published in the Lancet. The inexactitude is indicative of the chaos ensuing: when people cannot agree on whether 600,000 people died or not it is difficult to argue that something is not currently seriously wrong, and that a vacuum of power does not already exist. The government of Iraq is the government of the green zone. Democracy exists there and nowhere else.
Thus, the major detractors of the phased withdrawal option are missing the point. Major chaos will occur with or without troop withdrawal. The only hope Iraq has for genuine stability is a government which holds real legitimacy, and hence authority. This will never be the case for a government which is propped up by foreign troops alone. If coalition troops withdraw, the vacuum will widen. But then it will be filled. Whether this is by the current Iraqi government with a newly found legitimacy or violent sectarian groups is the real question, though few would place their bets on the current incumbents.
In order to give the current Iraqi rulership some chance we must spend another one to two years training Iraqi troops and increasing their involvement. They have been plagued with a lack of efficiency and discipline. However, unlike the police, they have stayed politically loyal. In the South, the UK is withdrawing out of the cities and the Iraqi troops are beginning to take over with some success. The south, however, suffers from little Sunni insurgency or al-Qaeda terrorism compared to Baghdad and the centre of the country. Anyone must be doubtful about their ability to secure the entire of Iraq. But, we have an obligation to give them a chance, however slim, and thus we must remain to continue their training for some time yet. Yet this does not mean that escalation is the answer. To give them any chance we must integrate them more and more into the running of security. We cannot principally use them as back up troops, then suddenly ‘cut and run’ when the Republicans are ousted from power next election.
I have spent long deliberating over the question “What is the solution to the Iraq crisis?” and I have come to the conclusion that there is very little room for optimism; instead one is presented with a choice between cynicism and naivety.
A continued coalition presence must be maintained to allow Iraqi troops further time to prepare. But we must reduce our numbers, albeit slowly, handing more and more responsibility to the Iraqi army. Our occupation, be it with 130,000 or 150,000 troops, will never rectify the dire security situation. This must be acknowledged. The slow transfer of power does not promise success but our sticking around guarantees only a perpetuation of failure. Kicking a stone wall at a dead end, however hard you try, is never going to yield a breakthrough, just more pain.
Doubtless the Middle East wants more freedom, even democracy, but it will not be imposed on it by the West. Every attempt to do so just makes any such hope more distant. Whether the superpowers of the world will ever bear heed to this is questionable. The lessons of Iraq will be soon forgotten, maybe even sooner than we might think.