A frequent question which faces development theorists is that of governance. Constantly we are told that the key to development is “good governance” - that is, strong institutions capable of fulfilling their roles, an emphasis on the effective enforcement of the rule of law and some level of participation of concerned sectional groups in the policy making process. Yet we are also faced with the question of how to govern developing states. In a state with strong ethnic, class or ideological divisions, a democratic system of participatory government faces serious difficulties in generating and enforcing policy with any effectiveness as it faces too many barriers to do so – all parties must be placated at the expense of coherent action, whilst short-term accountability to the electorate denies the opportunity for long-term economic reforms which may be damaging before they take effect. At the other end of the scale, the idea of an authoritarian, perhaps military, system of rule raises many ethical questions – what are the limits of legitimate rule for the purposes of development? Questioning the idea of legitimacy in developing countries often leads to claims of irrelevancy – people do not care who governs and how government is conducted provided they get their services, be they land rights, protection or simply their next meal. This hypothesis is fatally flawed for three main reasons. Firstly, it is incredibly patronising to suggest that people in developing countries have no political awareness worthy of giving them a say in government. Secondly, this is precisely the role of legitimacy – to ensure that these services are provided to the extent that people are satisfied with how the government acts. Thirdly, the role of the West in development and the issues of aid and support for authoritarian regimes is a very important ethical issue, since hopefully the end of the cold war has limited the need for geostrategic support of abhorrent, brutal dictatorships. Therefore, we can no longer use the realist paradigm of international relations to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses in the name of development.

The focus of this article is the second point – the legitimacy of government and how this relates to the concept of “good governance”. A government, in my view, achieves legitimacy in three ways. The first of these is the consent of people to be governed by it. In developing countries, this can be achieved, albeit by less-than-ideal means such as the implicit support for the government stemming from acceptance of the regime (provided the people are not coerced into supporting it on pain of imprisonment, torture or death, of course). Even in a developed democracy, the question of total consent to rule is an infamously knotty one and so will not be addressed in too much depth here.

Secondly, there is the issue of representation. Regardless of whether there is a representative ‘house’ or other governmental body , if the needs of the majority of groups are recognised and met by government then the system can be said to be representative. In developing countries this can happen through patron-client relationships – elites use governmental institutions to get the best deal for their region, tribe or other community, and this has been shown to be an effective, if inefficient, system of putting the views of these communities to government and having the government work for them.

The third component of legitimacy is accountability – the idea that a government, and individuals acting in and for that government, can be held accountable for their public and private actions through their office, be these actions corruption, abuse of privileges or simply inadequate policy making or implementation. Ultimately, there has to be a system in place to punish and remove from office those who are deemed unfit for government.

So what does all this mean for development? Firstly, let us look at consent and representation, although all three elements of legitimacy outlined already are deeply interwoven. Ethically, it is clearly wrong for a government to close down opposition and terrorise its subjects. Regardless of whether this is an imposition of ‘Western values’ (a frankly absurd and clichéd concept in itself), good governance should be morally acceptable and justifiable governance – good means for good ends. Unquestionable and unchecked authority is rarely, if ever, a benevolent force. Secondly, it is important that a people consent to be governed for policy to actually have any effect – people want to feel that policy is being made for their greater good, especially in the case of economic development policies such as free market reforms which can damage interests in the short term. Without a feeling of policy ownership, common national identities are damaged and the prospects of full scale implementation of policy are extremely limited.

Finally, the issue of accountability – the idea that a government can be held responsible and removed if it is seen to be inadequate, incompetent or even kleptocratic. Without proper accountability, corruption – an endemic problem across much of the developing world – will not be effectively countered. With a corrupt government, bureaucracy or state agency (such as the police force or military), the entire system of effective governance falls down – the rule of law becomes effectively null and void, the flow of public money is diverted, and faith and patience in the state is lost both on the part of the citizens of the country and the developed world. Without any kind of accountability, inequality will continue to grow because of the condemnable but appealing attitude: Why provide services for people who do not threaten your power as a government? Why implement a redistributive policy scheme and damage elite interests for the good of the populace? This is why there has to be consent, representation and accountability in the governance of the developing world and is therefore why legitimacy of government, despite the previously outlined superficial claims to the contrary, is a highly salient and relevant issue.