In 2004, the ranks of the European Union were swelled by the admission of ten largely central European states. In January of 2007 two more countries–Romania and Bulgaria–will accede, bringing membership to twenty seven. In the face of power wielded by a central European government over an unprecedented number of people–and with an expanding body of competencies–questions concerning the reach of its authority have never been more pressing.
If one were to believe the most Eurosceptic voices then the oppressive, arbitrary power of an authority centred in Brussels is already looming at the door of our long preserved national sovereignty. The Sun–ever the bastion of political neutrality–responded to the release of details concerning the Constitutional Treaty with the header: “Superstate Plans Revealed”. In a similar reaction, Michael Ancram claimed it was “…a gateway to a country called Europe”. A spectre, their language suggests, is haunting Europe–the spectre of supra-nationalism.
Meanwhile, the pro-European, or Europhile, voice is barely heard in the United Kingdom. To suggest that Europe is–or worse, should be–some kind of superstate, is the political equivalent of belching at the dinner table. If the Europhile were more vociferous though, one would hear a fairly robust defence against the body of anti-European fears.
But the definition of superstate is hard to pin down, and can be adapted to the argument one wishes to support. The OED gives us “a dominant political community, especially one formed from an alliance or union of several nations”. On the face of it this seems a little tame–common perception of the EU would seem to suggest it is this and something rather more distant, rather more arbitrary. The controversial element of this definition lies in whether the EU is fulfills the criterion of “dominance”.
It is certainly true that EU legislation has primacy over all that of individual member states. Similarly, decisions made by the European Court of Justice (this is not to be confused with the Court of Human Rights) are supreme. These must both be accepted upon entrance along with the extensive volumes of directives, decisions and regulations which have already been passed. In this sense the EU is dominant. Critics squeal with displeasure at the erosion of British national sovereignty which this has entailed, even those who recognise it to be a “pooling” of sovereignty rather than an absolute surrender.
However, a wider view of British national sovereignty reveals that it is not as water-tight a concept as its proponents might suggest. Policy can be dictated by even more arbitrary powers than the EU: NATO, the IMF, and some might even say to the USA. Moreover, the EU bodies to which the sovereignty is released contain representatives of our interests (as in the European Parliament or Council, and the Commission although it is supposed to be neutral). We also gain an amount of shared sovereignty over all other members. But the policy on where sovereignty should lie in the EU is rather more than this, and does not support fears of Brussels centralisation propounded by Eurosceptic tabloids or even prominent politicians such as Michael Howard.
The question of what level sovereignty is, or should be held at is addressed in the corpus of EU treaties. Despite the commitment to “ever closer union” and “unity in diversity” (or “Einheit in Vielfalt” as the tabloids might suggest we will soon be saying), its guiding principle is one of “subsidiarity”. By this it means the cascading of sovereignty to the appropriate level–so whilst environmental concerns (which transcend national borders) would best be dealt with on an EU-wide level, it recognises the need for local authorities to make decisions which differ from place to place. The appeal of this principle is evident without much explanation–the only impediments being a loyalty to sovereignty impractically held at a national level.
This principle is sadly not manifest. Whilst devolution occurred under admirable principles in the UK, there is no comprehensive drive towards the EU’s goal of subsidiarity. It may have the theoretical sovereignty to pass laws above the heads of its member states, but it certainly does not possess the raw power to bring about the principles it has dedicated itself to its constitution-like treaties. What is the limiting factor for the UK as an “awkward partner”? Europhobia. Those who might dare to concede Europhilia in Britain would most often be bent firmly over the knee of scepticism and given a sound electoral beating. The European Union cannot proceed to distribute sovereignty fairly when it is shackled to the popular appeal of politicians concerned with being re-elected–which of course, they always will be.
This is not to say that the EU is without its own significant problems, which themselves lead to its perception as a “superstate”. Elections to its Parliament attract shockingly low turnout, raising questions about the legitimacy of its most democratic body. You could spend many happy but fruitless hours asking people on the street if they could name one of their MEPs–happy that is until egged (or worse argued at) by a member of the local UKIP brigade. This lack of awareness, the lack of democratic credentials, and the utter disinterest of its citizens, are significant forces behind the hammer which slowly nails closed the coffin of subsidiarity and a practical distribution of sovereignty.
So are the wider concerns of where power should lie to be forgotten then, amidst a torrent of immigration caveats and sceptical editions of the Daily Populist and Sceptic’s Times? As the pressure on EU institutions increases with the widening into further–and culturally very different–states, and as its influence expands, these questions can surely only become more vital to resolve. Why not, then, as we will soon find it increasingly easy to do, start a discussion with a Romanian or Bulgarian about the power and role of the EU and how it has affected them?