On 15 December 2005 the last United Nations peacekeepers (largely made up of Pakistani troops) symbolically handed over to the newly trained Republic of Sierra Leone Army in Sierra Leone’s capital Freetown. This marked the end of a turbulent UN intervention in what has been one of Africa’s most war ravaged states and subsequently the country with one of the world’s lowest life expectancies at only 34. This war is unfortunately a far from unique story in recent African history.
What seems different in the Sierra Leone case is the particular nature of the United Nations and the UK intervention in the conflict’s resolution. UN peacekeepers/observers have been operating in this small West African country since the heyday of the conflict in the late 1990s. However, their presence in the region only served to highlight all of the central weaknesses of UN peacekeeping forces. Although originally centred on a dependable Indian Army force, the contingent heavily relied on troops of much lower calibre from countries like Kenya and Zambia who lacked the means to resolve a conflict where all the fabric of social order had broken down. As a result many of the divergent combatant factions targeted the peacekeepers, attacking them and taking them hostage. This was a major embarrassment for the UN, which was forced to negotiate with the very groups they were supposed to be controlling. How then did this morally and militarily weakened UN force come to restore order? In short, it didn’t.

To restrain the crisis, with UN approval, Britain deployed a strong military force comprising the Royal Irish Regiment, the Parachute Regiment and the SAS. When one of the more ambitious paramilitary groups, known as the West Side Boys, attempted to treat these British soldiers as they had the UN peacekeepers they received a different response. A combined SAS and Parachute regiment force released captured Royal Irish soldiers in a daring airborne operation that saw nearly all the captors killed, without a single British casualty.
Critics of this British force have highlighted the contribution made by Nigerian troops who were deployed shortly before the British, and warn of the return to colonial gunboat diplomacy which these actions represented. I contend that both the British and these more reliable African peacekeepers working in conjunction were responsible for creating the conditions where a lighter UN force was able to take over and begin post-conflict reconstruction. As to Gunboat diplomacy, it is important to differentiate between taking a hard line and using force to realise territorial ambitions. It is in my view a case of the end justifies the means, with the end being the respectable goal of restoring order and not annexation. Some commentators have used the examples of Sierra Leone and Afghanistan (where another UN endorsed but UK led force helped to establish order) to argue that the UN’s role as a peace enforcer is over and that the militarily developed nations of the West alone are capable of taking on that job more effectively. While recent experience might point in that direction, it is with an important caveat–close collaboration with the UN and local forces (Nigerian in the case of Sierra Leone).
Sierra Leone was not the first time a developed Western nation has stepped into a failing African state, and its success is not universal in previous cases. One example of failure is how US troops in Somalia lost 18 Rangers to the militia of Mohammed Farah Aidid, as they failed to liaise with fellow peacekeepers and were seeking a short-term solution to a long-term problem. Sierra Leone has shown that in conflict resolution investment is essential in terms of time and troops as well as aid. That is why it is only at the end of 2005 that the last peacekeepers are leaving Sierra Leone. But Peacekeeping missions and their difficulties are not exclusive to Africa–closer to home there have been peacekeepers in Bosnia since 1991 and in Sinai since the 1970s, all evidence that quick fixes don’t work in conflict resolution. This is in my opinion especially true of Africa.
This is equally true in aid distribution where it has been shown that NGOs operating alone without military forces are often counter-productive. The much-famed famine relief in Ethiopia, as supported by Live Aid, saw vast amounts of food delivered directly into a war zone with the result that a large proportion went towards supporting and feeding government troops and thus prolonging a vicious war and an equally vicious Stalinist regime. Aid doesn’t work without impartial troops to supervise its distribution. This view is now increasingly universal amongst aid agencies and governments alike, but it does require greater deployments of dependable troops. In order to do this the West needs to ignore accusations of neo-imperialism as this is the default defence used by despotic African regimes that see intervention purely in terms of Black and White. To ease these accusations greater collaboration is needed with moderate and stable African governments so that combined forces can be deployed and local diplomatic pressure can be utilised. The West cannot operate in Africa without African friends. Deployments are also dependent upon resources and the British Army in particular is suffering the most extensive over stretch since 1944. Currently, with the commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan, Africa comes bottom of the list.
There is, however, a growing mood in the West for greater contribution towards conflict resolution in Africa. One of the many causes of this is the long shadow cast by the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The inaction and indifference of the West to the plight of the hundreds of thousands of Rwandans massacred by the government sponsored Interhamwe militia has become a motif for greater intervention in failing African states. The pathetic debates about the definition of the word genocide by the US government and the UN remain emotive to hear. The farce of having Rwanda on the UN Security Council while UN troops were in that country revealed more deficiencies in the structure of the United Nations. This ‘Black Holocaust’ has been further publicised in recent years by books such as Shake Hands with the Devil by the UN commander in Rwanda, Lieutenant General Romeo Dalaire, and by films such as Hotel Rwanda. Even as early as April 1995, 74% of Americans polled agreed that the UN should forcibly have entered the country and set up safe havens. This has had a subsequent effect on more recent conflicts, particularly for the US government. On 25 July 2003 President Bush announced that 2,300 US Marines were to be sent to Liberia to assist African peacekeepers. A Gallup poll found that 57% of Americans backed this move. Indeed a January 2003 PIPA poll found that 55% of Americans believed that the US had a moral obligation to use military force in Africa to prevent genocide. This is however compared to a 74% response for doing the same in Europe, indicating a continued reluctance to intervene in African affairs.
More recently the West’s attention has been drawn to the Dharfur region of Sudan. Most people in the West will be familiar with the Arab persecution of Black Sudanese in the south-west of the country. Media coverage of the systematic murder, rape and ethnic cleansing carried out by government backed militias has brought the issue to public attention. Aid agencies are struggling to prevent the famine that results from this conflict. They are currently protected by a peacekeeping force composed of African troops under the auspices of the African Union. However, despite a poll indicating that 60% of Americans would back a US deployment to the Sudan, the US senate voted against a bill for $55 million to pay for training and logistical support for the African peacekeepers. This has prompted the announcement that they will only be able to remain for a few more months, after which the militias will be given a free hand. Britain, for her part, has indicated preparations to deploy troops to the region. At a recent dinner General Dannatt, Commander-in-chief British forces Land, announced that there is a strong possibility of British troops becoming involved in Africa in the near future. In particular he mentioned the Sudan and the Congo as likely areas. Dharfur will stand as an important test for Tony Blair’s government, especially as the Prime Minister has professed an interest in Africa’s development, founding the self publicising ‘Commission for Africa’. Now is the time to step up to the mark and show that Rwanda was an exception and that Britain is going to make the example of Sierra Leone the rule. British forces are over stretched with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans and many more, but this is not helped by the MOD increasing commitments while cutting back on troop numbers. A single British battalion battle group combined with troops from other nations would be more than adequate for the situation, and would send out a strong message of Britain’s commitment to Africa. As pointed out before, any deployment cannot be a whirlwind quick fix, but must be prepared for the long haul, if necessary with a strong UN endorsed US/UK led force enforcing a peace settlement and then handing over to a lighter UN force who can supervise its maintenance. This would combine a viable solution with a continued and effective role for the UN.
The UK has a special relationship with many of the countries in Africa. This is partly due to Britain’s historic role as a colonial power, but this link is more than merely historical as Britain has helped to shape many of the emergent nations across the continent. From establishing post-independence constitutions to economic interaction, for better or worse, Britain has been a presence in Africa long after her last colony became independent. Britain’s stance on Apartheid and embargo of Rhodesia displayed to the world a willingness to side with principle against former allies. This is a relationship which the USA does not have and although America has always had an eye on Africa it has done likewise to the rest of the world. However Britain still finds intervention in African affairs an embarrassing issue. In stark contrast to French policy in Africa, diplomatic pressure has always been favoured over military intervention. Often this is the correct response as the results of partisan French and Belgian actions have displayed. However it does sometimes feel like Britain is willing to turn a blind eye to her obligations. In particular the example of the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe stands out. Make no mistake Zimbabwe is no Sierra Leone or Sudan. There is no war in Zimbabwe, and no genocide (not yet at least). What there is however is a despotic regime determined upon the persecution and ethnic cleansing of a number of minority groups including the minority Ndebele tribe and White Zimbabweans. As a Zimbabwean myself it strikes me as odd that Britain can create spurious justification for regime change in Iraq, but cannot apply greater pressure on Robert Mugabe’s regime and encourage the South African government to do likewise. As the guarantors of the Lancaster house agreement Britain is obliged to observe democracy in Zimbabwe and attempt to prevent its erosion. Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, if Britain does not take action soon, within the next ten years the subject of preventing a Zimbabwean civil war will no longer be conjecture.
The West has learnt a great deal about intervening in Africa in the last thirty years and it appears is finally developing the moral courage to ignore accusations of neo-imperialism. What is important for the present and to the future is that a new ‘coalition of the willing’ is formed, combining those African nations capable of helping their neighbours and those western nations with the will power and means to prevent genocide and end the endemic and brutal wars that plague much of Africa. Equally important is a reappraisal of the function and purpose of the UN so that it has a role, but is not left to deal with problems it is incapable of solving. If we are willing there need never be another Rwanda.